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A Patent Reformist Supreme Court and
Its Unearthed Precedent
Samuel F. Ernst*
How is it that the Supreme Court, a generalist court, is leading
a project of innovation reform in our times while the court of
appeals established to encourage innovation is having its
precedent stricken down time and again? This decade the Supreme
Court has issued far more patent law decisions than in any decade
since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. In doing so, the
Supreme Court has overruled the Federal Circuit in roughly threequarters of the patent cases in which the Supreme Court has issued
opinions. In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has
established rules that favor accused infringers over patent holders,
and the result has been an era of patent litigation reform far more
impactful than anything Congress has achieved. Scholars have
observed that the Supreme Court tends to overrule Federal Circuit
decisions that (1) impose rigid legal rules as opposed to flexible
standards; (2) adopt special rules for patent law cases rather than
applying general principles of law and equity applicable to all
federal cases; and/or (3) fail to grant sufficient discretion to the
district courts. This paper examines the twenty-eight Supreme
Court opinions overruling the Federal Circuit since 2000 and
quantifies their rationales to discover that, while these reasons are
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often invoked, the Supreme Court’s most common rationale is that
the Federal Circuit has disregarded or cabined its older precedent
from before the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit, from before
the 1952 Patent Act, and even from before the 20th Century. The
Court has relied on this rationale in twenty-one of the twenty-eight
cases. The paper then seeks to probe beneath the surface level
patterns to discover the deeper roots of the discord between the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Constitutional law
scholars have observed that the Supreme Court’s policy
preferences are the primary, unstated motivation behind its
decisions. The Court writes opinions that rely on the flexible tools
of precedent and stare decisis in order to implement its policy
choices while maintaining its institutional reputation for neutrality.
The Court does this by influencing precedent vitality; the Court
selects which of its precedent to rely upon and augment and which
of its precedent to distinguish and narrow. This process runs in
direct conflict with the Federal Circuit, a court that was originally
conceived and viewed by some of its members as a court intended
to bring uniformity to patent law in a way that would reinvigorate
patent rights. The Federal Circuit would implement the 1952
Patent Act in a way that would draw patent law out of the
nineteenth century. But for the Supreme Court, the 1952 Act was a
mere codification of patent law as developed by the courts for over
a hundred years. Hence, the Federal Circuit seeks to influence
precedent vitality at direct cross-purposes with the Supreme Court.
The result of the Supreme Court’s project has been a new era of
common law patent reform in favor of accused infringers, which is
gaining momentum as the Supreme Court decides far more patent
cases than it has since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has issued far more opinions in patent
cases this decade than in any decade since the passage of the Patent
Act of 1952.1 The Court has issued thirty-one patent law opinions
in the 2010s, fifteen more than the decade finishing a distant
second, the 1960s, which saw the issuance of only sixteen patent
law opinions.2 Nor is there any sign the Court is slowing down in
its engagement with patent law; the Court recently granted
certiorari in another patent law case,3 making it likely that the
Court will issue as many as thirty-five patent law opinions this
decade.
This sudden surge in patent law activity at the high court raises
questions with respect to the Supreme Court’s relationship with the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the circuit court with
nationwide appellate jurisdiction over patent law. Since its creation
in 1982,4 the Federal Circuit has never received more scrutiny
from the Supreme Court.5 No doubt this is due in part to the
growing importance of patent disputes in a legal landscape
featuring booming high technology and pharmaceutical industries,
cellphone wars, and patent trolls stalking the horizon.6 But these
phenomena were present in the 2000s as well, a decade that saw
the issuance of only ten Supreme Court substantive patent law
opinions.7 Rather, this sudden burst of activity indicates the
Supreme Court is increasingly interested in scrutinizing and, more
1

See infra Section I.A.; see also Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship
Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP.
67, 67 & Table 1 (2016) (“The Supreme Court takes a lot of our cases”); Seth P.
Waxman, May You Live in Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 17 CHI.KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 214, 215–16 (2018) (describing a “fourfold increase in the rate
of patent decisions” since 2006).
2
See infra Part I.
3
See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018)
(order granting certiorari).
4
See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (establishing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
5
See Waxman, supra note 1 at 216 (“In the 23 years between 1983 and its eBay
decision in 2006, the Supreme Court decided 17 patent cases. In the 11 years since eBay,
it decided 33.”).
6
See Waxman, supra note 1 at 216 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s increased interest in
patent law tracks the rising importance of intellectual property in our society.”).
7
See infra Part I.
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often than not, correcting the patent law jurisprudence of the
Federal Circuit.
Since the year 2000, the Supreme Court has reversed or
vacated the Federal Circuit in patent law cases in 74% of the
opinions it has issued reviewing that court8: ten judgments
affirmed9 and 28 judgments reversed or vacated (in whole or in
part).10 This reversal rate in patent law appeals combined with the
8

These numbers do not include the case of Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635 (2009), because although that appeal arose from a patent litigation proceeding,
the issue before the Supreme Court was one of general civil procedure, not patent law.
See id. at 1867 (holding that when a district court remands claims to a state court after
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the remand order is not based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to preclude federal appellate review of the order). Nor do these
numbers include the three Supreme Court patent law cases during this period on certiorari
to courts other than the Federal Circuit. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2401, 2406 (2015) (on certiorari to the Ninth Circuit); F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136, 141 (2013) (on certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,
256 (2013) (on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas).
9
The ten affirmances are: Oil States Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1379 (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016); Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); Bowman v. Monsanto,
569 U.S. 278, 289 (2013); Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 446 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 793 (2011); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A.,
563 U.S. 754, 771 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010); J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001).
10
The twenty-eight opinions vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit (at least in part)
since 2000 are: WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139
(2018) (reversed); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (reversed);
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017) (vacated-in-part, reversed-inpart); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017) (reversed);
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2017)
(reversed); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct.
954, 967 (2017) (vacated-in-part); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734,
743 (2017) (reversed); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016)
(reversed); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (vacated);
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015) (vacated); Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (vacated); Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014) (vacated); Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014) (reversed); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 564 (2014) (vacated); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (reversed); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014) (reversed); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013) (affirmed-in-part, reversedin-part); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 426 (2012)
(reversed); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
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marked increase in the number of patent law appeals the Supreme
Court wants to hear raises the question: how does the Supreme
Court’s perspective on patent law differ from that of the Federal
Circuit? What is the Supreme Court doing to patent law?
Part I of this paper analyzes and quantifies the four most
common justifications the Supreme Court gives for disturbing
Federal Circuit patent law rulings: (1) that the Federal Circuit has
disregarded or cabined Supreme Court precedent; (2) that the
Federal Circuit imposed a rigid, inflexible rule where a general
standard would be more appropriate; (3) that the Federal Circuit
improperly created a special rule for patent law; and (4) that the
Federal Circuit’s rule granted insufficient discretion to the district
court. The appellate lawyer would be well advised to argue a
combination of these points to get the Supreme Court’s attention
on a petition for certiorari. The most common justification given
by the Supreme Court for its reversal or vacatur of Federal Circuit
patent rulings is that the Federal Circuit has disregarded or cabined
Supreme Court precedent from prior to the 1982 creation of the
Federal Circuit or from prior to the passage of the Patent Act of
1952. The Court has relied on this rationale in twenty-one out of
the twenty-eight opinions in which it has overruled the Federal
Circuit on patent law issues since 2000.11 None of the three
remaining rationales have been relied upon in more than nine
opinions issued since 2000.12
Part I of this paper continues by analyzing the Supreme Court’s
patent law decisions this century to conclude that we are in an era
of Supreme Court patent law reform to favor accused infringers.
Out of the forty-one substantive patent law opinions issued by the
Supreme Court since 2000 (including the three on certiorari to
(2012) (reversed); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008)
(reversed); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459 (2007) (reversed); KSR
Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (reversed); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (reversed); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (vacated); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28, 46 (2006) (vacated); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208
(2005) (vacated); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834
(2002) (vacated); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
742 (2002) (vacated).
11
See infra Part I.
12
See id.
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regional circuits), twenty-four established a rule favoring accused
infringers; eleven established a rule favoring patent holders; and
six established a rule that may favor either party depending on the
particular facts of the case.13 More important than these numbers,
however, is the fundamental importance of Supreme Court rulings
in remaking patent litigation to favor the accused. Since 2000, the
Supreme Court has expanded the obviousness doctrine, given teeth
to the doctrine of patent ineligible subject matter, revitalized the
exhaustion doctrine, made it more difficult to obtain patent
injunctions (particularly for non-practicing entities), narrowly
construed statutes providing remedies for international
infringement, strengthened the defense of patent claim
indefiniteness, and made other common law reforms to favor
accused infringers.14
Part II of this paper steps out of the cloister of patent law
scholarship to explore the reasons why the Court has chosen to
pursue this policy of patent litigation reform. Supreme Court
scholarship in other areas of law, such as constitutional law,
indicates that the Court is influenced in its policy decisions by
external forces in the legal system. As with these other areas of
law, the Court has been influenced to pursue patent litigation
reform because of several interrelated external factors: the
explosion of patent enforcement litigation in the lower courts and,
in particular, non-practicing entity litigation; litigation reform
campaigns mounted by high tech businesses in response to NPE
activity; a steep increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in
patent cases; and a general metanarrative that, rather than
encouraging innovation, patents can sometimes stand as a thicket
to true innovation, because startup companies and other innovators
must navigate a thicket of demand letters and lawsuits asserting
patents that have never been commercialized just to get a product
to market.15
Part II concludes by exploring the methods employed by the
Supreme Court in pursuing this agenda. Supreme Court scholars
have observed that the Court pursues unstated legal policy
13
14
15

See infra Part I.
See id.
See infra Part II.
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objectives through the flexible and seemingly neutral tool of stare
decisis to influence precedent vitality. This means amplifying
precedent that supports the unstated policy goals and disregarding
or narrowing precedent that stands opposed to those goals. With
respect to patent law, the unmistakable conclusion is that the
Supreme Court has pursued a policy of patent litigation reform to
favor accused infringers, and has done so very effectively by
relying on its precedent from two previous eras of patent law
reform: (1) the late 1800s, when large railroad companies and
farmers were plagued by a thicket of patents and non-practicing
entities, in response to which the Supreme Court created common
law reform to ease these crises; and (2) the 1930s to the 1960s,
another period of patent common law reform when the courts were
distrustful of patent monopolies and strengthened patent misuse,
antitrust, and exhaustion remedies as well as invigorating the
obviousness bar.16
Part III of this paper explains why the Supreme Court’s patent
litigation reform project has come into direct conflict with the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. From its founding in
1982, the Federal Circuit’s early judges and stakeholders in the
creation of the court viewed the court as intended to create
uniformity in patent law in order to strengthen patent rights. If the
Federal Circuit were to bring guidance and uniformity to patent
law, this would require the creation of uniform, rigid rules and the
rejection of flexible, equitable standards that granted too much
discretion to the district courts to restrict patent rights. And if the
Federal Circuit were to create patent law reforms to strengthen
patent rights, then it would have to have a free hand in interpreting
the 1952 Patent Act in new ways and not adhering to Supreme
Court precedent from prior to the passage of the 1952 statute. All
of this comes into direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s mission
of reviving cases from eras of patent law reform that grant
discretion to the district courts to rule on patent law cases with
equity and flexibility in order to protect true innovations from the
patent thicket.17

16
17

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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I. PATENT LAW REFORM AT THE SUPREME COURT: 2000-PRESENT
A. The Patent Law Explosion at the Supreme Court
At one time, patent law was an obscure area of the law, largely
noticed only by patent practitioners.18 Relative to the current
decade, the Supreme Court issued few patent law opinions in the
decades after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act. The Court issued
opinions in only five patent law cases in the 1950s (including cases
from prior to the issuance of the Patent Act),19 and, although this
number ticked up to sixteen cases in the 1960s,20 the Court
continued at a relatively plodding pace: with ten cases in the
1970s,21 seven cases in the 1980s,22 and eight cases in the 1990s.23
But at the turn of the millennium, the Court’s interest in patent law
markedly increased. The Court has decided forty-one cases on
substantive patent law issues since the year 2000,24 and, in the
current decade in particular, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent
law has reached a frenetic level. As of the October 2018 term, the
Court has decided thirty-one patent cases in this decade alone,25 far
more than in any other decade since the 1940s. This sudden spike
in patent law opinions is illustrated by the bar graph below:

18

See CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND
6 (2015) (“Patent practice has long labored under a
reputation for inaccessibility, professional specialization, and narrowly fact-specific court
rulings. All these factors have functioned to distance patent law from the historical
mainstream.”); Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 924 (2008) (“Intellectual property law was in the backwater only a few
decades ago.”).
19
See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); Sanford v.
Kepner, 344 U.S. 13 (1952); Besser Mfg. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); U.S. v.
U.S. Gypsum, 340 U.S. 76 (1950); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339
U.S. 605 (1950).
20
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION,
available at https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/32Q2-K7EP].
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
See cases cited supra notes 8–10.
25
See id.
THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA
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Figure 1: Number of Patent Law Cases Decided by the
Supreme Court by Decade
Of the forty-one patent law opinions the Court has issued since
2000, all but three have been on certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.26 The Supreme Court vacated or
reversed the Federal Circuit in whole or in part in twenty-eight
cases and affirmed the Federal Circuit ten times for a reversal rate
of 74% in patent cases.27 Various studies differ on how high the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is relative to other circuits. One
study concluded that, from 1999 to 2008, the Federal Circuit had
the highest reversal rate of any circuit court.28 Another study
looking at the years 2006-2016 concluded, “[o]ver the last ten
terms, [the Federal Circuit’s] reversal rate has averaged around
70%, just slightly above the circuit median of 66.7%.”29 An
examination of the SCOTUSblog Stat Packs for the years 2010 to
2017 reveals that the Federal Circuit had the sixth highest reversal
rate of the thirteen circuit courts of appeals in all cases (not just
patent cases):

26

See id.
See id.
28
See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 2 Landslide 8, 9 (2010) (concluding that from the years 1999 to 2008, the
Federal Circuit had a reversal rate of 83%, which was higher than the Ninth Circuit’s
reversal rate of 80% and higher than the circuit median of 68%).
29
Dyk, supra note 1 at 71–72.
27
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Circuit

Affirmances Reversals
or Vacaturs
6
38
6
29
7
24
29
96
7
20
11
27
15
32
15
22
11
16
11
16
10
14
14
13
8
7

Sixth
Eleventh
Third
Ninth
Eighth
Federal
Fifth
Second
DC
Seventh
Tenth
Fourth
First

Total
Decided
44
35
31
126
27
38
47
37
27
27
24
27
15

11

Percentage
of Reversals
86.36%
82.86%
77.42%
76.19%
74.07%
71.05%
68.06%
59.46%
59.26%
59.26%
58.33%
48.15%
46.67%

Figure 2: Reversal Rate by Circuit (2010-2017)30
Hence, the Federal Circuit had a slightly higher reversal rate in
patent cases than it did in all cases, and this figure places the
Federal Circuit sixth among all thirteen circuit courts of appeals
with respect to overall reversal rate. But this should not be so,
given that the Federal Circuit is a court established to have
specialized expertise in the area of patent law while the Supreme
Court is a generalist court. One would think that the Federal
Circuit’s specialized expertise in patent law would cause it to err
less frequently than the regional circuits do.
Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s unduly high reversal rate in
patent cases is explained by the nationwide reach of its appellate
jurisdiction over patent law issues.31 One of the rationales for
Supreme Court review is a split between the circuits,32 and this is
generally not possible in patent law cases decided by a single court
of appeals.33 Accordingly, the only basis for the Supreme Court to
30

SCOTUSblog, “Stat Pack Archive,” available at http://www.scotusblog.com
/reference/stat-pack/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EX9P-QTXB].
31
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
32
SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
33
Dyk, supra note 1, at 75 (“Very few of the Federal Circuit cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court involve circuit splits. By my estimation, only one over the last decade.
And a study from 2013 found a total of only eight in the history of our court.”) (citing
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review a Federal Circuit patent law opinion is that the Federal
Circuit “has decided an important question of federal law that has
not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.”34 In other words, it appears that more
often than not the Supreme Court elects to review Federal Circuit
patent law decisions because at least four members of the Court
disagree with those decisions. This suspicion is borne out by the
high reversal rate.35
B. Supreme Court Rationales for Overruling the Federal Circuit
Why does the Supreme Court disagree with the Federal Circuit
on patent law issues? Where does the Federal Circuit err in the
Supreme Court’s view, and what rationales does the Supreme
Court offer for overruling the Federal Circuit? Scholars and other
Court-observers have noted four principle rationales, which are
often interrelated, that the Supreme Court frequently offers when
explaining why the Federal Circuit was wrong:
1) The Federal Circuit’s rule granted insufficient
discretion to the district court;36
Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2008)); Mark S. Davies, Seeking
Supreme Court Review in Patent Cases, Law360 (Apr. 21, 2008),
https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/53599/seeking-supreme-court-review-in-patent-cases
[https://perma.cc/VJ2C-WCEW]; Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection
at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 275 (2013)). But see
Shubha Ghosh, A Court Divided, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 346, 346 (2018)
(pointing to “the splits within the Federal Circuit, as revealed in many en banc
decisions,” and arguing that “[t]his division is one reason why patent law has taken up a
larger part of the Supreme Court’s docket recently”).
34
SUP. CT. R. 10(C).
35
See cases cited supra notes 8–10.
36
See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving
Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 275, 282 (2012) (noting
cases where the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit for failing to grant sufficient
deference to the district court or to the PTO); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1057–
61 (2003) (Discussing the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the district court in claim
construction and obviousness determinations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of that
approach); cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U.
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2017) (observing that in the early years of the Federal Circuit, “the
Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner inconsistent with
administrative law principles”).
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2) The Federal Circuit imposed a rigid, inflexible
rule where a flexible standard would be more
appropriate;37
3) The Federal Circuit improperly created a special
rule for patent law, rather than relying on general
legal frameworks or principles of federal law;38
and/or
37

See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 33, at 350 (“In the patent area, we witness the Court
resorting to open ended standards as a counter to blunt rules.”); Dyk, supra note 1, at 80
(“Our court, in keeping with the legislative history of our statute, views our task as in part
articulating clear rules; the Supreme Court on the other hand views clear rules as often
suspect.”); Kazhdan, supra note 36, at 282 (“Scholars, practitioners, and even a number
of Federal Circuit judges have pointed to the Supreme Court’s repeated criticism of the
Federal Circuit for applying bright-line rules in patent cases instead of looking to more
case-specific factors.”) (citing Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE
L.J. 2, 42 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “push[ing] back against Federal
Circuit formalism”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 808–14 (2008)); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 33 (2007) (referring to “[t]he [Supreme]
Court’s general admonitions to avoid the use of rigid and mandatory formulas”);
Katherine E. White, How the Supreme Court’s Decisions over the Last Decade Have ReShaped Federal Circuit Jurisprudence, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 315, 324 (2008) (“[T]he
Supreme Court prefers flexible rules over rigid ones”); Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit increasingly has articulated rules
of law to promote certainty, at the expense of fairness.” Holbrook’s 2003 article argues
that “the Supreme Court has expressly encouraged this approach,” but we have seen that
in the year’s since 2003, the Court has reversed course and frequently reversed the
Federal Circuit for imposing rigid rules, perhaps inspired by Professor Holbrook’s
article!); Jay Dratler, Jr. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: A Case of
Supervision by Generalists, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 185, 187 (2011) (“In virtually
every case where [the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal Circuit], the High Court
has rejected a narrow, formulaic rule proposed by the Federal Circuit and opted for
something more general and flexible.”).
38
See, e.g., Dyk, supra note 1 at 76 (“What is interesting, though, is that a significant
proportion of the Supreme Court’s cases from our court involve reconciling our
jurisprudence with jurisprudence in other areas. In other words, the Supreme Court thinks
that part of its task is to bring to bear its generalist perspective on our specialty areas.”);
Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, The Federal Circuit Under Fire, S.F. Att’y, Fall 2014, at
40, 41–42, available at https://m.mto.com/Templates/media/files/Reprints/Bleich%20
%20Patashnik%20—%20Supreme%20Court%20Watch%20Fall%202014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2SL-XYT2] (“Is the Supreme Court too unsophisticated in patent law
to appreciate the wise insights of expert Federal Circuit judges, or are those Federal
Circuit judges too narrowly focused on patent law to appreciate the broader rules of
jurisprudence, procedure, and statutory interpretation?”)
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4) The Federal Circuit disregarded Supreme Court
precedent.39
This author has examined the twenty-eight patent law cases
decided since 2000 where the Supreme Court has vacated or
reversed the Federal Circuit in order to quantify how often the
Supreme Court relies on each of these rationales. This analysis is
complicated to some degree by the fact that these rationales are
often interrelated and overlapping. For example, in Octane Fitness
v. Icon Health & Fitness, the Court held that the Federal Circuit
used an incorrect test for determining whether a case is
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, allowing for an award of
attorney’s fees.40 The Federal Circuit’s rule was that “‘[a] case
may be deemed exceptional’ under § 285 only in two limited
circumstances: ‘when there has been some material inappropriate
conduct,’ or when the litigation is both ‘brought in subjective bad
faith’ and ‘objectively baseless.’”41 The Court rejected this rule
based on all four rationales discussed above. The Court reasoned
that “[t]he framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks
Furniture is unduly rigid,” (Rationale 2) and that “it impermissibly
encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts”
(Rationale 1).42 Instead of creating a special rule for patent law, the
39

See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 33, at 350 (“[T]he Supreme Court has recourse to
common law judging, reverting to concepts of reasonableness and its own precedent (as
opposed to those of the Federal Circuit) in order to bring light to the darkness.”);
Holbrook, supra note 36, at 1061 (pointing to “the early years of the [Federal Circuit’s]
existence where, in light of the Supreme Court’s absence from the field of patent law, the
Federal Circuit generally ignored––if not overruled––Supreme Court precedent”); Dyk,
supra note 1, at 82 (noting with respect to patent subject matter eligibility that “[s]ome of
the most significant patent jurisprudence is not the product of a detailed statute but of
Supreme Court decisions that have created extra-statutory requirements for
patentability. . . Thus, older Supreme Court cases remain highly relevant in interpreting
the doctrines”); White, supra note 37, at 324 (observing that the Supreme Court has made
clear that the Federal Circuit should “follow Supreme Court precedent first before
resorting to creating new Federal Circuit law”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the
Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court–and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
787, 804 (2010) (“We will have to see whether the Federal Circuit made the issue of its
authority as a specialized court to stray from Supreme Court precedents clear enough for
the Supreme Court to consider the problem.”).
40
Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752–53 (2014).
41
Id. at 1752 (quoting and reversing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l,
Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005)).
42
Id. at 1755.
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Federal Circuit should have awarded attorney’s fees based on
flexible, equitable standards used by the courts in other areas of
law, such as copyright law (Rationale 3): “As in the comparable
context of the Copyright Act, ‘there is no precise rule or formula
for making these determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion
should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have
identified.’”43 This approach was mandated by Supreme Court
precedent in these other areas of law that the Federal Circuit had
failed to apply (Rationale 4).44 The Federal Circuit had further
disregarded Supreme Court precedent that had held that “the
addition of the phrase ‘exceptional case’ to § 285 was ‘for
purposes of clarification only’” and did not overrule years of
precedent to create a rigid standard unique to patent law to cabin
the discretion of the district court (Rationales 1, 2, 3, 4).45 In place
of the Federal Circuit’s rule, “[d]istrict courts may determine
whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their
discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”46 Hence,
the rationales are often interrelated and overlapping. The reader is
therefore advised that the counts below do not indicate the total
number of cases in which the Court has relied exclusively on one of
the four rationales. Rather, these are the number of cases in which
the Court has relied on at least the rationale in question, and
perhaps on other of the rationales as well.

43

Id. at 1756 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)).
Id. (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534).
45
Id. at 1753 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653, n. 8
(1983)).
46
Id. at 1756.
44
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Figure 3: Supreme Court Rationales for Overruling the Federal
Circuit in Patent Cases (Since 2000)
Close analysis of the twenty-eight Supreme Court opinions
since 2000 vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit on patent law
issues reveals that the most frequent rationale given by the Court
for reversing the Federal Circuit is that the court of appeals has
disregarded its precedent from before the 1982 creation of the
Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court has relied on this rationale in
twenty-one of the twenty-eight opinions.47 By comparison, the
Supreme Court has corrected the Federal Circuit for failing to grant
sufficient discretion to the district court in six cases.48 The Court
has faulted the Federal Circuit for creating a rigid, inflexible rule in
eight cases.49 And the Court has overruled the Federal Circuit for
creating a special rule for patent law in nine cases.50 Five of the
twenty-eight opinions involved pure statutory construction and
relied on none of these rationales.51 The bar graph above illustrates
the relative number of cases in which the Court has relied on each
of these rationales in the twenty-eight cases.

47
48
49
50
51

See infra Section I.B.4 for discussion and citations.
See infra Section I.B.1 for discussion and citations.
See infra Section I.B.2 for discussion and citations.
See infra Section I.B.3 for discussion and citations.
See infra Section I.B.4 for discussion and citations.
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1. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal
Circuit for Granting Insufficient Discretion to the District
Court
Several commentators have observed a pattern of the Supreme
Court overruling the Federal Circuit when the Federal Circuit fails
to grant sufficient discretion to the district court.52 In fact, the
Court has reversed the Federal Circuit on this basis in only six of
the twenty-eight cases in this study.53
It is natural that this issue would not arise with tremendous
frequency because it is most often implicated in cases involving
the standard of appellate review under a statute appearing to grant
discretion to the district court, and not all cases involve such
52
See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving
Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 275, 282 (2012) (noting
cases where the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit for failing to grant sufficient
deference to the district court or to the PTO); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1057–
61 (2003) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the district court in claim
construction and obviousness determinations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of that
approach); cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U.
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2017) (observing that in the early years of the Federal Circuit, “the
Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner inconsistent with
administrative law principles”).
53
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (The Federal
Circuit erred in part because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests
within the equitable discretion of the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (“Rigid preventive rules [with respect to the non-obviousness
determination] that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither
necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework established by the
Federal Circuit [for determining whether a case is exceptional under the Patent Act’s fee
shifting provision] . . . is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory
grant of discretion to district courts.”); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134
S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285
determination [of whether a case is ‘exceptional’ and attorney fees should be awarded]”);
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (holding that the
court of appeals must apply a deferential “clear error” standard in reviewing factual
determinations underlying district court claim constructions); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (holding that the district court’s determination
of whether to award enhanced damages for willful infringement must be reviewed for
abuse of discretion).
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matters. Indeed, this was the issue in four of the six cases in this
category. In a pair of related cases, Octane Fitness and Highmark
v. Allcare Health Management Systems, the Court held,
respectively: (1) that the Federal Circuit’s rule for determining that
a case was “exceptional” under the Patent Act’s fee shifting statute
was unduly rigid in a way that failed to give sufficient discretion to
the district court;54 and (2) that the Federal Circuit must review
such “exceptional case” determinations for abuse of discretion.55 In
these cases the Court was interpreting Section 285 of the Patent
Act,56 which provides, “[t]he [district] court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”57
Similarly, in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, the Court
interpreted Section 284 of the Patent Act to decide that the Federal
Circuit granted insufficient deference to the district court in
reviewing determinations as to whether treble damages should be
awarded for willful infringement.58 The Court concluded that the
Federal Circuit must apply an abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing such determinations because “Section 284 gives district
courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages.”59
The frequency with which the Court relies on this rationale is
perhaps overstated because it was invoked in three fundamentally
important cases: eBay v. MercExchange, KSR v. Teleflex, and Teva
v. Sandoz. In eBay, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”60 This was
also a case involving a statutory grant of discretion to the district
court, Section 283 of the Patent Act, which the Court emphasized
“expressly provides that injunctions ‘may’ issue ‘in accordance
with the principles of equity.”61 The Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s general rule that an injunction must issue against
54

Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755.
Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749.
56
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
57
35 U.S.C. § 285 (emphasis added).
58
Halo Electronics, 136 S. Ct at 1934.
59
Id. at 1934 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides, in pertinent part, “the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”
(emphasis added)).
60
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
61
Id. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283).
55
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patent infringement because “the decision whether to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
court.”62 The eBay decision had a big impact on patent litigation,63
with district courts granting injunctions much less frequently than
before and routinely denying injunctions to non-practicing
entities.64
Two other fundamental decisions in which the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit for its failure to grant sufficient
discretion to the district court were KSR and Teva. In KSR, the
Court altered the patent litigation landscape by liberalizing the
Federal Circuit’s restrictive test for determining whether a patent
was invalid for obviousness. The Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s rule in part because it was a “[r]igid preventative rule[]
that den[ied] factfinders recourse to common sense” and other
chains of reasoning.65
And in Teva the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that
all aspects of district court claim construction be reviewed de novo,
holding instead that factual determinations underlying claim
construction rulings be reviewed for clear error.66 The Court
reasoned that “clear error review is ‘particularly important’ where
patent law is at issue because patent law ‘is a field where so much
depends upon familiarity with specific problems and principles not

62

Id. at 394.
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in
eBay represented a sea change in patent litigation.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949,
1949 (2016) (“The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange is widely
regarded as one of the most important patent law rulings of the past decade.”).
64
See, e.g., Chien & Lemley, supra note 63, at 9–10 (finding that “courts have granted
about 75% of requests for injunctions, down from an estimated 95% pre-eBay” and that
courts denied contested injunctions to non-practicing entities about 90% of the time);
Seaman, supra note 63, at 1983, 1988 (finding that the injunction grant rate decreased to
72–75%, “a decline from the state of play before eBay, when injunctions were granted to
prevailing patentees in almost all cases,” and that non-practicing entities “rarely obtained
a permanent injunction after prevailing on liability”).
65
KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007).
66
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015).
63
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usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and
experience.’”67
Accordingly, the Supreme Court stands ready to correct the
Federal Circuit when it fails to grant sufficient discretion to the
district court and has done so in several fundamentally important
cases. However, the Court has only cited this rationale in six of the
twenty-eight cases since 2000 in which it reversed or vacated the
Federal Circuit on patent law issues.68
2. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal
Circuit for Imposing a Rigid Rule
Scholars have noted a pattern of the Supreme Court rebuking
the Federal Circuit for creating rigid rules where a flexible
standard would be more appropriate.69 This reasoning often goes
hand-in-hand with Rationale 1, the Federal Circuit’s failure to
grant sufficient discretion to the district court, because the Federal
Circuit’s inflexible rule improperly cabins the discretion of the
district court. Specifically, the Supreme Court has cited Rationales
1 and 2 together in at least four cases, which are discussed in the

67
Id. at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
610 (1950)).
68
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (The Federal
Circuit erred in part because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests
within the equitable discretion of the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co., 550 U.S. at 428
(“Rigid preventive rules [with respect to the non-obviousness determination] that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law
nor consistent with it.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit [for determining
whether a case is exceptional under the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision] . . . is unduly
rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
courts.”); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014)
(“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard
in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination [of whether a case is
‘exceptional’ and attorney fees should be awarded]”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
at 843 (holding that the court of appeals must apply a deferential “clear error” standard in
reviewing factual determinations underlying district court claim constructions); Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (holding that the district
court’s determination of whether to award enhanced damages for willful infringement
must be reviewed for abuse of discretion).
69
See sources cited supra note 37.
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previous section.70 But the Court has invoked Rationale 2 in at
least four additional cases for a total of eight such cases since
2000.71
In addition to KSR and eBay, discussed above,72 this category
includes several additional fundamental cases that have been
discussed extensively in the scholarly literature. In Festo v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, the Court addressed the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. This doctrine provides
that when a patent applicant “responds to [a] rejection by
narrowing his claims, this prosecution history estops him from
later arguing that the subject matter covered by the original,
broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent.”73 The Federal
Circuit had created an inflexible rule that, “by narrowing a claim to
obtain a patent, the patentee surrenders all equivalents to the
amended claim element.”74 The Court rejected this “per se rule,”
holding that, even when the patent holder has made a narrowing
70

See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (“Section 284 permits district courts to
exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate
test.”); Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“The framework established by the
Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the
statutory grant of discretion to the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co., 550 U.S. at 428
(“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are
neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394
(the Federal Circuit erred in creating a “general rule . . . that a permanent injunction will
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged” in part because “the decision
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts.”).
71
See Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s machine or
transformation test is an important and useful clue to patentability, but “we have neither
said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”); Illinois Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 (2006) (holding that tying arrangements
involving patented products should be assessed for antitrust violation under a flexible rule
of reason standard rather than under a per se prohibition); Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005) (There is no “categorical rule” that the
Patent Act’s safe harbor provision allowing for experimental use related to the
development and submission of information to the Food and Drug Administration
excludes experimentation on drugs or use of compounds that are never submitted to the
FDA); Festo, 535 U.S at 1840–41 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “categorical bar” on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents in cases where patentees narrowed their claims
during patent prosecution).
72
See supra Section I.B.1.
73
Festo, 535 U.S at 727.
74
Id.
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amendment, the court must examine the subject matter surrendered
before determining whether the accused subject matter infringes
the amended claim.75 The Court stated that it had “consistently
applied the doctrine in a flexible way” and rejected “imposing a
complete bar that resorts to the very literalism the equivalents rule
is designed to overcome.”76
Another important case in this category is Mayo v. Prometheus,
in which the Supreme Court addressed the test for patent eligible
subject matter.77 The Court had previously held, in Bilski v.
Kappos, that the Federal Circuit had incorrectly decided that the
exclusive test for determining the patent eligibility of a process
was whether the claimed invention was tied to a particular machine
or resulted in the transformation of matter.78 The Court stated that,
while the “machine-or-transformation test” is a “useful and
important clue,” the Federal Circuit erred in applying it rigidly as
“the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process.’”79
In Mayo, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit for again
rigidly applying this machine-or-transformation test to decide that
a method for calibrating drug dosage was patent eligible.80 The
Federal Circuit had held that, merely because the administration of
drugs to a patient resulted in the transformation of blood taken
from the patient’s body, there was a “transformation of matter,”
and the claimed method was therefore patent eligible under the
machine-or-transformation test.81 The Court rejected this
unyielding application of the “machine-or-transformation” test,
holding that, “in stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is
an ‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither
said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’
75

Id. at 1840.
Id.
77
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
78
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010). Despite correcting the Federal Circuit’s
rule, the Bilski case resulted in an affirmance by the Supreme Court, and is therefore not
included in the twenty-eight cases that are the particular subject of this study of why the
Supreme Court vacates or reverses the Federal Circuit.
79
Id. at 604.
80
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296.
81
Id. at 1296.
76
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exclusion.”82 Once again, the Supreme Court faulted the Federal
Circuit for doggedly applying a hard rule rather than flexible
standards.
This group of cases, Festo, Mayo, Bilski, KSR, and eBay, were
widely discussed in patent scholarship because they worked
fundamental changes in the law.83 Nonetheless, the reasoning they
all share – that the Federal Circuit erred by applying an inflexible
rule rather than a general standard – has only been relied upon by
the Supreme Court in eight of the twenty-eight patent cases since
2000 in which it has vacated or reversed the Federal Circuit.84
3. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal
Circuit for Creating a Special Rule for Patent Law
A third pattern noted by scholars is that the Supreme Court
tends to overrule the Federal Circuit when it creates a special rule
82

Id. at 1303 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S.at 602–04) (emphasis in original).
Westlaw searches of secondary sources citing to these cases reveal that Festo has
been cited 1,431 times, Mayo 1,231 times, Bilski 1,734 times, KSR 2,018 times, and eBay
3,346 times. (search last performed, Aug. 18, 2018).
84
See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (“Section
284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic
constraints of the Seagate test.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit in
Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of
discretion to the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428
(2007) (“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense,
however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (the Federal Circuit erred in creating a
“general rule . . . that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged” in part because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts.”); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1303 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s machine or transformation test is an important and
useful clue to patentability, but “we have neither said nor implied that the test trumps the
‘law of nature’ exclusion.”); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S 28, 43
(2006) (holding that tying arrangements involving patented products should be assessed
for antitrust violation under a flexible rule of reason standard rather than under a per se
prohibition); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005)
(There is no “categorical rule” that the Patent Act’s safe harbor provision allowing for
experimental use related to the development and submission of information to the Food
and Drug Administration excludes experimentation on drugs or use of compounds that
are never submitted to the FDA); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S 722, 737–40 (2002) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “categorical bar” on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents in cases where patentees narrowed their claims
during patent prosecution).
83
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for patent law, rather than applying general equitable and legal
principles.85 The Supreme Court has cited this rationale as a basis
for reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit in nine out of twentyeight cases since 2000, making it the second most frequently cited
rationale.86 In four of the cases this rationale is relied upon in
connection with Rationale 1 (that the Federal Circuit failed to grant
sufficient discretion to the district court) and/or Rationale 2 (that
the Federal Circuit created an inflexible rule); this is because the
rigid rule that failed to grant discretion to the district court was also
a special rule the Federal Circuit created for patent law.87
However, this rationale was cited in five additional cases as well.88
85

See supra note 38.
See Halo, 136 S. Ct at 1933 (one problem with the Federal Circuit’s intent test for
willful infringement is that “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of
the actor at the time of the challenged conduct”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give
deference to factual determinations underlying claim construction violated the generally
applicable FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6)); Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (rejecting
the Federal Circuit’s rule that litigants establish entitlement to fees by clear and
convincing evidence because “[w]e have not interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes
to require proof of entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence”); eBay Inc., 547
U.S. at 394 (the four factor test for granting permanent injunctions in other areas of law
“apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 736 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the Federal Circuit’s rule
against international patent exhaustion violated general common law principles against
restraints on alienation and improperly differentiated copyright exhaustion from patent
exhaustion); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (the treatment of laches in a patent case should not be different from
its treatment under the Copyright Act or depart from “this Court’s many reiterations of
the general rule”); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015)
(holding that the defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to inducement
of infringement because in tort law and criminal law an act can sometimes be intentional
even if the actor lacks knowledge that the act is illegal); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014) (the Federal Circuit was incorrect to
put the burden of proof of infringement on the declaratory judgment plaintiff because it
violated the general application of the Declaratory Judgment Act in non-patent cases);
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (rejecting
the notion that the term “arising under” in the statute granting the Federal Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals should be interpreted differently than that
phrase is interpreted in other jurisdictional statutes).
87
See Halo, 136 S. Ct at 1933 (one problem with the Federal Circuit’s intent test for
willful infringement is that “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of
the actor at the time of the challenged conduct”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,135 S. Ct. at
843 (holding that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give deference to factual determinations
underlying claim construction violated the generally applicable FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6));
86
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An important case applying this rationale is the Supreme
Court’s recent patent exhaustion opinion, Impression Products v.
Lexmark. One of the holdings in Impression Products is that the
sale of a patented product overseas exhausts all U.S. patent rights
in that product.89 In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule to the
contrary, the Supreme Court reasoned that applying patent
exhaustion to foreign sales was dictated by the common law’s
“antipathy toward restraints on alienation.”90 The Court had
already decided that U.S. copyright exhaustion was triggered by a
foreign sale91 and decided that the same general common law
principle applies to the Patent Act. Like copyright exhaustion,
“[p]atent exhaustion, too, has its roots in the antipathy toward
restraints on alienation[,] . . . and nothing in the text or history of
the Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that
borderless common law principle to domestic sales.”92 Rather,
“differentiating the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale
doctrines would make little theoretical or practical sense: ‘The two

Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule that litigants
establish entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence because “[w]e have not
interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees by
clear and convincing evidence”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (the four factor test for
granting permanent injunctions in other areas of law “apply with equal force to disputes
arising under the Patent Act”).
88
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 816 F.3d at 736 (the Federal Circuit’s rule against
international patent exhaustion violated general common law principles against restraints
on alienation and improperly differentiated copyright exhaustion from patent exhaustion);
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (the treatment of laches in a
patent case should not be different from its treatment under the Copyright Act or depart
from “this Court’s many reiterations of the general rule”); Commil USA, LLC, 135 S. Ct.
at 1931 (holding that the defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to
inducement of infringement because in tort law and criminal law an act can sometimes be
intentional even if the actor lacks knowledge that the act is illegal); Medtronic, Inc., 571
U.S. at 203 (the Federal Circuit was incorrect to put the burden of proof of infringement
on the declaratory judgment plaintiff because it violated the general application of the
Declaratory Judgment Act in non-patent cases); Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 834
(rejecting the notion that the term “arising under” in the statute granting the Federal
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals should be interpreted differently than
that phrase is interpreted in other jurisdictional statutes).
89
Impression Prods. Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017).
90
Id. at 1536.
91
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013).
92
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 816 F.3d at 736.
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share a ‘strong similarity . . . and identity of purpose.’”93 Hence,
while the Federal Circuit creates special rules for patent law, the
Supreme Court views the law as “borderless,” such that patent law
should comply with general legal principles, whether they come
from the common law or other areas of federal law, like the
Copyright Act.
Another example of this rationale appears in Commil, USA v.
Cisco Systems, in which the Court held that a defendant’s belief
that a patent was invalid did not constitute a defense to inducement
of infringement.94 The Federal Circuit had held that “evidence of
an accused infringer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may negate
the requisite intent for induced infringement.”95 One of the reasons
the Supreme Court concluded this was wrong was because it was
contrary to the meaning of intent in tort law and criminal law. The
Court reasoned that “[o]ur law is . . . no stranger to the possibility
that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil liability, even
if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the
law.”96 For example, in the context of tortious interference with
contract, “[w]hile the invalidity of a contract is a defense to
tortious interference, belief in invalidity is irrelevant.”97 And in
criminal law, “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply
rooted in the American legal system.’”98 The Federal Circuit had
again erred by creating a special rule for intent in the context of
patent law, rather than looking to general principles of law in other
subject areas.
As a substantive matter, there are fundamentally important
patent cases since 2000 in which the Supreme Court has relied on
Rationales 1, 2, or 3 to overrule the Federal Circuit. From a strictly
93

Id. at 1536 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913)).
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015)
95
Commil USA, LLC, 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoted in and vacated by
Commil USA, LLC, 135 S. Ct. at 1925).
96
Id. at 1930 (quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A.,
559 U.S. 573, 582–83 (2010)) (ellipses in original).
97
Id. (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comment i (1979);
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS
110 (5th ed. 1984)).
98
Id. (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
94
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numerical standpoint, however, by far the most common reason for
the Supreme Court overruling the Federal Circuit is Rationale 4 –
that the Federal Circuit disregarded Supreme Court precedent from
prior to that court’s 1982 creation.99
4. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal
Circuit for Disregarding or Cabining Supreme Court
Precedent from Before 1982
Despite the fact that patent law is theoretically a creature of
statutory law, there are relatively few cases since 2000 in which
the Court has relied purely on statutory construction to overrule the
Federal Circuit.100 This is further evidence of Craig Allen Nard’s
point that patent law is largely common law. Professor Nard
writes:
[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a
common law enabling statute, leaving ample room
for courts to fill in the interstices or to create
doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s
99

See infra Section I.B.4
Of the twenty-eight patent cases vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit since
2000, only five cases did not rely on at least one of the four rationales discussed in this
paper. Each of these other cases involved pure statutory interpretation without relying on
the Federal Circuit’s failure to grant discretion to the district court, the improper creation
of rigid rules or special rules for patent law, or the Federal Circuit’s disregard of Supreme
Court precedent from prior to 1982. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353
(2018) (holding that under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board must
issue a final written decision addressing every patent claim challenged in an initial
petition for inter parties review); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669
(2017) (holding that the requirement of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act that a generic applicant provide the patent holder with its application and
manufacturing information is not enforceable by an injunction under federal law; and that
an applicant may provide notice of commercial marketing to the patent holder before,
rather than after, the FDA licenses its biosimilar.); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp.,
137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017) (holding that a single component of a multicomponent
invention cannot constitute “all or a substantial portion” of the components supplied from
the United States for combination abroad such as to impose infringement liability under
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 432 (2016)
(holding that the “article of manufacture” as used in 35 U.S.C. § 289 governing damages
for design patent infringement can be a component of a product even if consumers cannot
purchase the component separately); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
566 U.S. 399, 426 (2012) (holding that under 21 U.S.C. § 355, a generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer may assert a counterclaim in an infringement suit seeking correction of the
branded pharmaceutical’s inaccurate use code).
100
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province. Indeed, the common law has been the
dominant legal force in the development of U.S.
patent law for over two hundred years.101
This certainly appears to be how the contemporary Supreme
Court views patent law. Of the twenty-eight patent law opinions
reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit since 2000, twenty-one do
so by relying, at least in part, on Supreme Court precedent from
prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit; and most of the
cases rely, at least in part, on precedent from prior to the 1952
passage of the Patent Act.102 These numbers do not come from a
101

Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 53 (2010).
102
See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2137 (2018)
(relying on Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964)); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532–34, 1536
(2017) (relying on United States v. Univis, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); United States v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone
Co, 246 U.S. 8, 17–18 (1918); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co, 243 U.S. 490, 501
(1917); Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film, 243 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1917); Bauer &
Cie v. O’Donnel, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S.
659, 661 (1895); Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 362–63 (1893); Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1853)); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) (relying on Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,
353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods.,
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 963 (2017) (relying on Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395
(1946); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S.
314, 326 (1894); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537 (1891)); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (rather than following the Federal Circuit’s
new test for willful infringement, “district courts are ‘to be guided by[the] sound legal
principles’ developed over nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of the
Patent Act”) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)
(referring, inter alia to Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Comm’n, 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)));
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (“Allowing this new
defense would also undermine a presumption that is a ‘common core of thought and
truth’ reflected in this Court’s precedents for a century.”)) (quoting Radio Corp. of Am.
v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015) (relying on Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.,
339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913
(2014) (relying on United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942);
Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916)); Limelight Networks, Inc.
v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014) (relying on Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526–27 (1972); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
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raw citation count of all cases cited by the Court in the relevant
opinions. Rather, the author has considered those particular
passages where the Supreme Court explains its reasoning to
determine that the Federal Circuit erred. In these critical passages,
the Court usually relies on its case law from prior to 1952.103
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (reversing the Federal Circuit because it
“abandoned that holistic, equitable approach” for determining whether a case is
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 that had been applied by the lower courts “[f]or
three decades after the [1952] enactment of § 285”) (internal citations omitted) (also
relying on Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n. 8 (1983); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family
Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 198 (2014) (relying on Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647,
662 (1880); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 609 (1869)); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013) (relying on Funk Brothers
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–81 (2012) (relying on Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 187 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–87 (1978)); Quanta Comput.,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628–29, 631 (2008) (relying on United States v.
Univis, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 446
(1940); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (relying on
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972); Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. 183 (1856)); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–17 (2007)
(relying on Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson’s Black Rock
v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62 (1969); Graham v. John Deere Co., 382 U.S. 1,
12 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. 248 (1850)); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130–32 (2007)
(relying on Altwater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 364 (1943); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006) (relying on Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n., 209 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1908); Cont’l Paper
Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–30 (1908)); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006) (relying on United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977)); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (relying on The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22, 28 (1913)) Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
738 (2002) (relying on Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456, 465 (1889); Goodyear
Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 230 (1880)).
103
In this regard this study is of a different nature than Professor Joe Miller’s important
work on citation counts in recent Supreme Court intellectual property decisions. See
Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme Court IP
Decisions? A Case Study, 21 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2017). Professor Miller’s citation
counts indicate that “[t]he Court’s recent IP cases cite more recent Supreme Court cases
more often than they cite older Supreme Court cases . . . .” Id. at 20. However, Professor
Miller has studied all of the cases cited in i.p. opinions, not just those cases substantively
relied upon in those passages of patent law opinions where the Court is explaining its
reasoning. Id. at 18 (“I developed the citation list for each case by reading the entire
opinion(s) . . . treating all portions of the cited opinion as on par with the others.”). In
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Analysis of a few representative cases will demonstrate the
Supreme Court’s methodology of correcting the Federal Circuit for
failing to adhere to Supreme Court precedent from prior to 1952.
In SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Products, the Court held
that laches cannot be asserted as a defense against damages
occurring within the Patent Act’s six year limitations period.104
The Patent Act has a somewhat peculiar statute of limitations in
that it does not run forward from the date an infringement claim
accrues. Rather, the statute imposes no time limit on when a claim
for ongoing infringement may be brought, but bars recovery of
damages occurring six years prior to the lawsuit: “Except as
otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.”105 In
1992, the Federal Circuit established the rule that even damages
occurring within that six-year period could be barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches.106
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach
because it departed from “the well-established rule, often repeated
by this Court, that laches cannot be invoked to bar a claim for
damages incurred within a limitations period specified by
Congress.”107 The Court then proceeded to rely on four Supreme
Court opinions from prior to the passage of the 1952 Patent Act
that held that there can be no laches defense to a claim brought
within the statute of limitations: cases from 1946, 1935, 1894, and

fact, when Professor Miller calculates an “authority score” for I.P. cases cited by the
Supreme Court, the results indicate that older cases generally have a higher authority
score. Of the cases with the top ten authority scores, only one was issued later than 1982.
Id. at 30. Of the cases with the top thirty-two authority scores, only eight were issued
later than 1982. Id.
104
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954,
959 (2017).
105
35 U.S.C. § 286 (1999).
106
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1030 (1992) (en
banc), reaff’d by SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods, 807 F.3d
1311, 1322–24 (2015) (en banc), vacated by SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 n. 8 (2017).
107
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 963.
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1891.108 The Court chastised the Federal Circuit and the
respondent for “dismiss[ing] the significance” of these Supreme
Court opinions “because they were not made in patent cases.”109
Relying again on Rationale 3 (that the Federal Circuit should not
make special rules for patent law), the Court pointed out that
“patent law is governed by the same common-law principles,
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other
areas of civil litigation.”110 Moreover, these cases could not be
disregarded on the basis that they preceded the passage of the 1952
Patent Act. The Court held that “we are not convinced that
Congress, in enacting § 282 of the Patent Act, departed from the
general rule regarding the application of laches to damages
suffered within the time for filing suit set out in a statute of
limitations.”111 Hence, as even the dissent in SCA Hygiene
conceded, “the 1952 Patent Act was primarily intended to codify
existing law.”112 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has cautioned
the Federal Circuit again and again that it should not disregard its
precedent from prior to 1952.113
Another important example is KSR v. Teleflex, where the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for determining
whether a patent is invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. §
103.114 The Federal Circuit had established a rule called “the
‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ test (TSM test), under which
a patent claim is only proved obvious if ‘some motivation or
108

Id. (relying on Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (“If Congress
explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end
of the matter”); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the
term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law”); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S.
314, 326 (1894) (“Though a good defense in equity, laches is no defense at law. If the
plaintiff at law has brought his action within the period fixed by the statute of limitations,
no court can deprive him of his right to proceed”); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537
(1891) (“So long as the demands secured were not barred by the statute of limitations,
there could be no laches in prosecuting a suit”)).
109
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 964.
110
Id. at 964 (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 1333 (Hughes, J.,
dissenting)).
111
Id at 966.
112
Id. at 968 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923,
1929–30 (2016) .
113
See sources cited supra note 102.
114
KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–17 (2007).
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suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the
prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person
having ordinary skill in the art.”115 The Supreme Court rejected
this rule as “unduly rigid” and because it failed to grant sufficient
flexibility to the district court in making the obviousness
determination (Rationales 1 and 2).116
In doing so, however, the Court also relied on the fact that,
“[t]hroughout this Court’s engagement with the question of
obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible
approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied
the TSM test here.”117 The Court relied on its decision in Graham
v. John Deere Company, which issued in 1966 and was the first
Supreme Court opinion to interpret Section 103 of the new Patent
Act.118 But the Court also relied on its precedent from before the
passage of the Patent Act, including the 1850 decision in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood, which issued more than one hundred years before
the passage of the 1952 Act, and the 1950 decision in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.119 The
Court explicitly stated that, despite the passage of the 1952 Act,
“the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the ‘functional
approach’ of Hotchkiss.”120 Hence, the first case interpreting the
new statute did nothing more than to reaffirm the Court’s approach
established more than one hundred years before the statute was
passed.
This is significant because one of the major innovations of the
1952 Patent Act was to explicitly create, for the first time, an
“obviousness” requirement for patentability.121 Judge Giles Rich,
who helped to author the Patent Act and who was an original judge
on the Federal Circuit, wrote in a 1966 law review article that,
115

Id. at 407 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
116
Id. at 415, 421–22.
117
Id. at 415.
118
Id. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966)).
119
Id. (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 248 (1850); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950)).
120
Id.
121
See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of ‘Invention’ as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the
1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 864 (1964).
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prior to the 1952 Statute, the courts had developed a common law
standard of “invention” which was inconsistent and unpredictable,
a standard “which the courts pretended was being raised and
lowered like an elevator as though it were something tangible.”122
In Judge Rich’s opinion, this common law requirement was so
unpredictable that it could not genuinely be called a “standard”:
You really have to be on the Supreme Court to find
a ‘standard’ there because the only way it can work
is this: if you [i.e., the Supreme Court] think the
lower court was wrong in sustaining the patent, you
proclaim that it applied too low a standard and
reverse its decision, saying ‘That was not an
‘invention.’123
To support this damning criticism, Judge Rich cited to none
other than Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, one of the pre1952 cases the Supreme Court in KSR faulted the Federal Circuit
for disregarding.124 In Great Atlantic, the Court found the patentin-suit was invalid, reversing the decision of the Sixth Circuit
because “a standard of invention appears to have been used that is
less exacting than that required where a combination is made up
entirely of old components.”125 Moreover, as Judge Rich notes, the
“invention” standard that he criticized as being unpredictable
evolved out of the 1850 case, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the other
pre-1952 case that the Supreme Court in KSR cites as continuing to
define the non-obviousness requirement.126 What derived from this
case “was an injection into the law of what has ever since been
called the ‘requirement for invention,’” which, according to Judge
Rich, became a results-oriented, unpredictable non-standard.127
According to Judge Rich, the enactment of Section 103 of the
Patent Act in 1952 was intended to replace the uncertain standard

122

Id. at 861.
Id. (emphasis in original).
124
Id. at 861 n.15 (citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)).
125
Great Atlantic, 340 U.S. 147, 154.
126
Rich, supra note 121 at 859–60 (discussing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
248 (1851)).
127
Id. at 860.
123
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of “invention” with a more certain non-obviousness
requirement128:
This is not a ‘standard of invention’ and it is not
called a ‘requirement of invention.’ The presence or
absence of ‘invention’ is not mentioned. The use of
the term ‘invention’ was, in fact, carefully avoided
with a view to making a fresh start, free of all the
divergent
court
opinions
and
rhetorical
pronouncements about ‘invention.’ And in doing
that it was contemplated, as the House Report
states, that ‘This section should have a stabilizing
effect and minimize great departures which have
appeared in some cases.’129
Judge Rich states that “[t]he addition of section 103 was stated
in the House Report on the bill to be one of the two major changes
or innovations in the statute.”130 The new obviousness requirement
would solve the “vice or inadequacy of the judge made
requirement for ‘invention.’”131
And yet in KSR, in correcting the Federal Circuit’s application
of the obviousness requirement, the Supreme Court returned to its
“judge made,” pre-1952 precedent. The Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s stringent, rigid test for obviousness and reaffirmed “the
functional approach of Hotchkiss.”132 And the Court made plain
that
[n]either the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in
Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent
based on the combination of elements found in the
prior art. For over half a century, the Court has held
that a “patent for a combination which only unites
128

Id. at 864–65.
Id. (citing House Report No. 1923, 82nd Cong. 2nd Sess., to accompany H.R. 7794,
pg. 5 and also stating that “[t]he writer speaks from personal knowledge as one of the
drafters [of Section 103].”).
130
Id. at 864 (emphasis in original).
131
Id. at 865.
132
KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
129
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old elements with no change in their respective
functions . . . obviously withdraws what already is
known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes
the resources available to skillful men.”133
For the Supreme Court, the 1952 Patent Act merely codified its
precedent.134 For example, the Court has stated that the Act “left
intact the entire body of case law on direct infringement.”135 It is
therefore usually error for the Federal Circuit to disregard and
cabin the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 precedent. The Supreme
Court has relied on this reasoning again and again. It has been the
most common rationale for the Supreme Court to reverse the
Federal Circuit in patent cases since the year 2000.136
C. The Supreme Court’s Project of Patent Reform to Favor
Accused Infringers
We are confronted with a situation where the Supreme Court is
accepting an unprecedented number of patent cases,137 is reversing
the Federal Circuit at a relatively high rate,138 and is doing so by
reaffirming its precedent from prior to the 1952 passage of the
Patent Act.139 This raises the question: What is the Supreme Court
doing to patent law substantively?
The inescapable conclusion is that the Supreme Court is
engaged in an ongoing project of patent litigation reform to favor
accused infringers. First, as a purely numeric matter, of the fortyone substantive patent law opinions the Supreme Court has issued
since 2000, the majority of cases establish a rule to favor accused
infringers. Specifically, twenty-four opinions favor accused

133

Id. at 415–16 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950)).
134
See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505
n.20 (1964) (referring to “the 1952 codification” of contributory infringement law).
135
Id. at 602; see also Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26
(1997) (“In the context of infringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent
survived the passage of the 1952 Act.”).
136
See sources cited supra note 102.
137
See supra Part I.
138
See supra Part I.
139
See supra Section I.B.4
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infringers,140 eleven opinions favor patent holders,141 and six
opinions favor neither party.142
140

The twenty-four cases establishing a rule to favor accused infringers are: Oil States
Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018) (holding that inter partes
review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution);
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669, 1677 (2017) (holding that the
requirement of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act that an applicant
provide a sponsor with its application and manufacturing information is not enforceable
by federal injunction; and an applicant need not provide notice of commercial marketing
to the sponsor until after the FDA licenses its biosimilar); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529, 1535 (2017) (holding that a patent holder’s decision to
sell a product exhausts all patent rights in that item regardless of any contractual
restrictions the patent holder purports to impose; and the sale of a product overseas
triggers patent exhaustion); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (holding that a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of
incorporation for purposes of satisfying the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b));
Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017) (holding that a single
component of a multicomponent invention cannot constitute “all or a substantial portion”
of the components supplied from the United States for combination abroad such as to
impose infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (holding that the “article of manufacture” as used in 35
U.S.C. § 289 governing damages for design patent infringement can be a component of a
product even if consumers cannot purchase the component separately); Cuozzo Speed
Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141, 2144–45 (2016) (holding that a PTO
determination to institute inter parties review is final and non-appealable; and the PTO
may apply the broadest reasonable claim construction in conducting inter parties review);
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015) (on certiorari to the Ninth
Circuit) (holding that “a patent holder cannot charge royalties for his invention after its
patent term has expired”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351
(2014) (holding that a particular business method patent was invalid for failing to recite
patentable subject matter); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913
(2014) (holding that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
specification and prosecution history, fail to inform a person of ordinary skill in the art
with reasonable certainty what is the scope of the patented invention); Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 915, 918 (2014) (holding that there
is no claim for inducement of infringement where there is no underlying direct
infringement; hence, where no single entity performs all steps of a claimed method, such
that there is no direct infringement under Federal Circuit precedent, there is no claim for
inducement of infringement); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571
U.S. 191, 194 (2014) (holding that in a suit for declaratory judgment of noninfringement, the burden of proving infringement remains with the patent holder
defendant); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580
(2013) (holding that claims to isolated DNA segments recited phenomena of nature and
were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101); F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570
U.S. 136, 141 (2013) (on certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit) (holding that reverse
settlement payments, whereby a branded pharmaceutical company pays a generic
company royalties to keep the generic product off the market until the patent expires, can
violate the antitrust laws); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399,
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404 (2012) (holding that a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer may assert a
counterclaim in an infringement suit seeking correction of the branded pharmaceutical’s
inaccurate use code); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1294 (2012) (holding that patents claiming methods for calibrating the proper
dosage of a particular drug claimed laws of nature and were therefore invalid pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of eligible subject matter); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB
S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 757, 766 (2011) (holding that inducement of infringement requires
actual knowledge that the accused acts constituted infringement (or willful blindness to
that fact); constructive knowledge is insufficient)); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604,
607 (2010) (holding that a patent claiming a particular business method was not patent
eligible; and that the machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test for patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
638 (2008) (holding that where a patent holder authorizes a licensee to sell articles that
substantially embody patented methods, the patent rights in those articles are exhausted);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007) (35 U.S.C. § 271(f)
provides for infringement liability where a person “supplies . . . from the United States,”
for “combination” abroad, a patented invention’s “components.” The Court held that
where the accused “component” was software, infringement liability was only incurred
for supply of the disks containing the software, not for each copy of the software made
from those disks overseas); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007)
(holding that the Federal Circuit incorrectly reversed the District Court’s judgment that
the patent-in-suit was invalid as obvious based on an overly rigid rule contrary to the
Court’s precedent); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007)
(holding that a patent licensee is not required to terminate or breach its license in order to
seek declaratory judgment of patent invalidity); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547
U.S. 388, 390, 394 (2006) (holding that the decision to grant or deny a permanent
injunction is within the equitable discretion of the district court applying the four-factor
test applicable to all federal cases); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S.
193, 206 (2005) (holding that the exemption from patent infringement for uses of
patented inventions in a manner reasonably related to the development and submission of
information to the Food and Drug Administration does not categorically exclude
experiments on drugs where neither the drugs nor the experiments are ultimately the
subject of an FDA submission).
141
The eleven cases establishing a rule to favor patent holders are: WesternGeco LLC
v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2134 (2018) (holding that a patent holder
may collect lost profits damages based on loss of foreign sales when claiming
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality
Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (holding that laches cannot be asserted as a
defense against damages occurring within the Patent Act’s six year limitations period);
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (holding that the
Federal Circuit’s tri-partite test for enhanced damages for willful infringement was
incorrect and inconsistent with the district court’s discretion to grant enhanced damages);
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (holding that the
accused infringer’s belief that the patent was invalid is not a defense to the knowledge
element of a claim of induced infringement); Bowman v. Monsanto, 569 U.S. 278, 289
(2013) (holding that Monsanto’s patent rights were not exhausted in patented seeds a
farmer reproduced through planting and harvesting); Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431,
433–34 (2012) (holding that when a patent applicant files a civil action in the district
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To be clear, this is not a count of the number of cases where
the patent holder or the accused infringer necessarily won the
appeal in the Supreme Court. Rather, this is a count of the number
of cases where the Supreme Court’s opinion established a rule to
favor patent holders or accused infringers going forward. For
example, in SAS Institute v. Iancu, the victorious petitioner in the
court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 to challenge the denial of a patent application, the
patent applicant may introduce new evidence before the district court and the district
court must make de novo factual findings based on the new evidence); Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (holding that a patent must be proven invalid by clear and
convincing evidence); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 780 (2011) (holding that the Business Patent Procedures
Act of 1980 does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal
contractors); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (holding
that in order to prove an illegal tying arrangement involving a patented product, the
plaintiff must prove the defendant has market power in the tying product, and the
existence of the patent does not give rise to a presumption of market power); Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736–37, 741, 740 (2002)
(holding that prosecution history estoppel may apply to any claim amendment made to
satisfy patentability requirements; a claim amendment does not operate as an absolute bar
to the doctrine of equivalents; rather, the patent holder has the burden of proving that the
particular equivalent was not surrendered); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 127, 132 (2001) (holding that Utility patents may be granted for plants
under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and that the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 are not the exclusive means for obtaining patent protection for plants).
142
The six cases establishing a rule that could favor either party in a given case are:
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) (holding that the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board must issue a final written decision addressing every patent claim
challenged in an initial petition for inter partes review); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (holding that findings of fact underlying a
district court’s claim construction opinion must be reviewed for clear error); Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 564 (2014) (holding that all aspects of
district court determinations under the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision (35 U.S.C. §
285) are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (holding that the test for whether a case is
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 to allow for the awarding of attorney’s fees is that
the case stands out from other cases with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s
litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated; patent
litigants are not required to establish entitlement to fees by a heightened clear and
convincing evidence standard); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013) (on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas) (holding that a legal malpractice claim
requiring the resolution of a substantive question of patent law was not subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); and Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit does not
have appellate jurisdiction over a case based solely on the answer containing a patent
law counterclaim).
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Supreme Court was a party accused of patent infringement who
instituted an inter partes review in the PTO to challenge the
validity of the patent.143 SAS Institute won its appeal in the
Supreme Court, convincing the Court to establish a rule that, when
the PTO initiates an inter partes review, it must issue a final
written decision on all of the patent claims challenged in the
petitioner’s initial petition, even those patent claims about which
the PTO concludes there is no “reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail” in establishing invalidity.144 SAS
Institute won the Supreme Court appeal and will be entitled to a
final decision by the PTO in all of the patent claims it challenged,
but this will not necessarily assist accused infringers going
forward: if the PTO is forced to reach a decision on patent claims
about which it initially concluded there was no reasonable
likelihood of being proven invalid, the chances are that the PTO
will issue a final decision that those claims are, in fact, valid.
Because the pertinent statute provides that “[t]he petitioner in an
inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final
written decision . . . may not assert either in a civil action . . . or in
[an ITC proceeding] that the claim is invalid on any ground that
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that
inter partes review,” this will result in estopping the accused
infringer from attempting to invalidate those claims in a
subsequent infringement case in the district court.145 Accordingly,
whereas before the Court’s opinion in SAS Institute the PTO was
free to issue final written decisions only on those claims about
which it found a reasonable likelihood of invalidity, now it must
issue final written opinions on all claims challenged in the initial
petition, which will often result in the accused infringer being
estopped from challenging the validity of claims in subsequent
litigation. Even though the accused infringer won in SAS Institute,
the rule established in that case will not necessarily help accused
infringers.

143
144
145

SAS Inst., Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354.
Id. at 1354–53.
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2011).
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Below is a pie chart illustrating this author’s assessment of the
number of Supreme Court patent law cases since 2000 establishing
a rule to favor accused infringers, patent holders, or neither.

Figure 4: Number of Supreme Court patent cases since 2000
establishing a rule to favor patent holders, accused infringers, or
neither party.
More important than these numbers, however, is the
importance of the fundamental reforms the Supreme Court has
made to patent law since 2000 to favor accused infringers. These
include the following:




146
147

The Court made it far more difficult to obtain
patent injunctions, particularly for nonpracticing entities, by eliminating the Federal
Circuit’s rule that the district court must issue an
injunction against infringement;146
The Court expanded the availability to licensees
of declaratory judgment actions challenging the
validity of the licensed patent147 and put the

See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394.
See MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 137.

2018]

A PATENT REFORMIST SUPREME COURT










148

41

burden of proving infringement on the patent
holder in declaratory judgment actions;148
The Court made it easier to prove a patent
invalid for obviousness by making the standard
more flexible;149
The Court revitalized the defense of patent
exhaustion, whereby a patent holder may not
chase a patented product down the stream of
commerce, accusing each subsequent user of
infringement after an authorized first sale;150
The Court gave teeth to the doctrine of patent
ineligible subject matter, making it easier to
invalidate patents on the basis that they
improperly claim abstract ideas, natural
phenomena, or rules of nature;151
The Court made it easier to prove a patent
invalid for claim indefiniteness, making the test
less stringent and difficult to prove;152
The Court reinterpreted the patent venue statute,
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to forum
shop;153
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
new PTO inter partes review proceedings,
which provide a less expensive forum for
accused infringers to challenge patent validity,
thereby reducing settlement pressure;154

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014).
See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007).
150
See Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017); Quanta
Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
151
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–59 (2014);
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602–06 (2010); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–73 (2012).
152
See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014).
153
See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517
(2017).
154
See Oil States Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018).
149
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The Court narrowly construed statutes providing
remedies for international infringement and for
indirect infringement;155 and
 The Court issued multiple decisions favoring the
availability of generic pharmaceuticals and
adverse
to
patent-holding
branded
pharmaceutical companies.156
These and other reforms the Supreme Court has made are far
more impactful than any legislative reforms Congress has managed
to enact to relieve accused infringers from the patent thicket and
non-practicing entities.157 There can be no doubt that we are living
through an era of Supreme Court patent litigation reform to favor
accused infringers.

155

See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 741 (2017); Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
156
See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674 (2017); F.T.C. v. Actavis,
Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566
U.S. 399, 403–04 (2012); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
202–08 (2005).
157
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 398 (2011) (“Over the last two
decades, the courts have become the primary source of patent law and policy. During the
half decade or so that Congressional patent reform was pending, the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court reshaped the laws governing innovation in the United States by deciding
what can be patented, the scope of patent rights, and the remedies to which patentees are
entitled.”) (internal citations omitted).
The possible exception is Congress’s creation of new PTO proceedings to reexamine the
validity of issued patents, which has provided a less expensive forum for accused
infringers to challenge asserted patents. See generally Timothy B. Dyk & Samuel F.
Ernst, Patents, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 98:7
(Robert L. Haig, ed. 4th ed. 2016) (discussing 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (inter parties review
proceedings); §§ 321–29 (post-grant review proceedings)). However, even with respect to
this reform, the constitutional validity of these proceedings had to be safeguarded by the
Supreme Court. See Oil States Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018).
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II. PRECEDENT VITALITY AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE
SUPREME COURT
A. The Supreme Court Has Been Influenced in its Unstated Policy
of Patent Litigation Reform by External Influences
At this point an objection might be raised: The Supreme Court
doesn’t pursue policy objectives. In the words of Chief Justice
Roberts at his confirmation hearing, “I have no agenda . . . [I]t’s
my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”158
In fact, various Supreme Court scholars in studies across many
decades have concluded that “the justices’ policy preferences are
the primary determinant of their votes on the merits of cases.”159 In
addition, various studies have demonstrated that the justices’
policy preferences affect their votes on certiorari petitions.160 The
view that the justices are guided by their policy preferences is not
controversial. Rather, “judicial specialists generally agree that
justices, first and foremost, wish to see their policy preferences
etched into law. They are, in the eyes of many, ‘single-minded
seekers of legal policy.’”161 In this regard, the justices vote not
merely to determine the outcome of the particular case at hand. As
Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs write:
Instead, [the justices] endeavor to create legal
policy that will actually influence legal and
extralegal outcomes in the intended manner. Justice
Vinson suggested as much when he wrote: “What
158

Roberts, ‘My Job Is to Call Balls And Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’, CNN (Sept.
12,
2005)
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/
[https:
//perma.cc/YN3G-ND3M].
159
THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT 17 (2006) (citing C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT:
A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–47 (1948); DAVID W. ROHDE AND
HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002)).
160
Id. (citing Robert L Boucher & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as
Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson
Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Strategic Voting and
Gatekeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 549 (Oct. 1999)).
161
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–10 (1998) (quoted in
HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 159).
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the Court is interested in is the actual, practical
effect of the disputed decision – its consequences
for other litigants and in other situations.” In other
words, the justices care about the ultimate effect of
the legal policy they set. The justices recognize that
the legal rules or precedents established in the
Court’s majority opinions represent their most
important tool for influencing social, political, and
economic outcomes. Their behavior on the bench is
therefore principally motivated by the distributional
consequences of their opinions, and they want these
consequences to reflect their preferences.162
This all may be true with respect to controversial issues in
constitutional law and criminal procedure, but is it really true with
respect to patent law? Mark Tushnet has attempted to puzzle this
out in the context of a conservative Supreme Court taking a lot of
patent cases. Tushnet observes that “[p]opulist Democrats used to
try to keep the scope of patents narrow. They thought that patents
gave people monopolies (mostly true), and that monopolies were
bad for consumers (mostly true, too).”163 Why, then, would a
conservative Supreme Court be engaged in a project of weakening
patent rights? Professor Tushnet argues that
[t]he high-tech revolution changed how patents fit
into the political system, as suggested by the
common observation that Democrats get a lot of
political contributions from people in high-tech
industries. The new view of patents is that they
encourage creativity. The image of the inventor in
the garage behind the house isn’t entirely accurate,
but it captures the idea that patents are good for a
certain class of small businesses.164

162

HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 159 at 17–18 (quoting Fred M. Vinson, Work of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 TEX. BAR. J. 551, 552 (1949) (emphasis in original).
163
MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 190–
91 (2013).
164
Id. at 191.
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If this is true, then maybe the conservative Supreme Court is
now anti-patent because Democrats are aligned with the high-tech
industry, which is pro-patent.
But Professor Tushnet has it all wrong. The high-tech industry
in Silicon Valley has for many years been advocating for patent
reform to weaken patent rights because of the plague of nonpracticing entities imposing a tax on innovation.165 There is a view
in the high-tech industry and among many scholars that patents
impede, rather than encourage, true innovation.166 Accordingly,
even if Tushnet is correct that Democrats are aligned with the
Silicon Valley high-tech industry, this would appear to result in an
anti-patent bias, not a pro-patent bias.
Moreover, the image of the sole inventor in his garage
laboratory battling large corporations that have stolen his invention
is not at all accurate anymore, if it even ever was.167 Rather, “small
companies, consumers, and nonprofits—are increasingly being
dragged into the world of high-priced patent litigation.”168 And
“the majority of non-practicing entity lawsuits are filed against

165

See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J.
848, 935 (2016) (“Many of these [patent reform] proposals emerged from strangebedfellow reformist coalitions of large high-tech firms and grassroots antipatent
cultures.”).
166
See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Walter Frick, Patents are Eating the World
and Hurting Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 26, 2014), http://hbr.org
/2014/06/patents-are-eating-the-world-and-hurting-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/X4GGQST9]; Press Release, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, SIIA Applauds Innovation Act:
Calls it an Important, Bipartisan Patent Reform Effort (July 29, 2015), http:
//www.siia.net/Press/SIIA-Applauds-Innovation-Act-Calls-it-an-Important-BipartisanPatent-Reform-Effort [https://perma.cc/G9GE-DZ2X]. The claims of less than half of all
patents are ever commercialized and only about 5% of patents are ever licensed for a
royalty. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362 (2010).
167
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 709
(2012) (Surveys of hundreds of significant new technologies show that almost all of them
are invented simultaneously or nearly simultaneously by two or more teams working
independently of each other.”).
168
Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En
Masse for Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235,
238 (2014).
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small businesses with revenues under $10 million.”169
Accordingly, Tushnet is incorrect when he asks us
to imagine a case in which liberals vote to uphold a
patent because they think that consumers as little
guys are going to gain a lot from being able to buy
the new device, and conservatives vote to uphold it
because they like big businesses that typically are
the ones who get the patented item to the larger
market.170
In fact, the picture is more nuanced: patents often hurt
consumers as well as large and small high-tech businesses and
generic pharmaceutical companies while helping branded
pharmaceutical companies.171 Against this background,
conservative and liberal justices alike are nonetheless largely
voting to weaken patent rights, not strengthen them, and hinder
branded pharmaceutical companies in cases with very few
dissenting opinions.172

169
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Perhaps because of this peculiar phenomenon at the Supreme
Court, Tushnet throws up his hands and concludes:
No one knows enough about the effects of patent
law on innovation and marketing to be sure who’s
going to benefit from decisions making it easier or
harder to get valid patents. In general, the justices
are simply going to try to build the best – that is, the
most legally defensible – body of patent law they
can try.173
But there is a vast literature studying the effects of patent law on
innovation and marketing.174 And the justices are not simply
struggling to say something legally defensible about patent law. As
demonstrated quantitatively and qualitatively above, the Supreme
Court is pursuing a concerted policy of patent litigation reform to
favor accused infringers.175
But why? What would unify liberal and conservative justices
alike to pursue a policy of patent reform? The solution might be
that the policy being pursued is not influenced so much by politics
in the traditional liberal versus conservative model. Rather, the
justices are influenced in patent law decisions by external
pressures that are largely unrelated to Democratic versus
Republican politics.
Jeffrey Segal has conducted a study demonstrating that the
Supreme Court is largely unconstrained by the pressures on
political actors in the other branches.176 This stands to reason,
because “[t]hough it is true that Congress can overrule the Court
by passing ordinary legislation, the difficulty of passing override
legislation combined with the even greater difficulty of the Court’s
knowing whether that would happen creates an environment in
173
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which members of the Court can rationally vote their sincere
policy preferences.”177 Hence, the justices’ decision-making does
not blow in the storm of Democratic versus Republican politics, as
it does in the other branches. Nonetheless, “Justices, like most
politically sophisticated adults, have preferences of policy and
presumably derive greater utility when those preferences are
written into law than when they are not.”178 But because of their
judicial independence, Justices can pursue their preferred policies
steadfastly, without being swayed directly by such ephemeral
matters as whether Silicon Valley or the pharmaceutical industry is
giving more money to Republicans or Democrats. Hence, “[t]he
federal courts were designed to be independent; we should not be
surprised that they are capable of actually being independent.”179
Nonetheless, “[n]o man is an island, entire of itself; every man
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.”180 So too with the
women and men on the Supreme Court. If the justices, as Segal
argues, are not generally influenced by shifting partisan political
winds; and if, in the area of patent law, the justices do not appear
influenced by their steadfast liberal or conservative ideologies as
they may be in other areas of law; then what external pressures
influence their decision-making? Charles R. Epp argues that the
Court’s agenda is influenced by concentrated external pressures
coming from the legal field.181 First, “[t]he justices have developed
an institutionalized reluctance to decide issues that have
‘percolated’ little in lower courts.”182 Accordingly, “the available
options for a place on the agenda are limited to those issues on
which there is sustained litigation in lower courts.”183 Second,
“[t]he political economy of litigation – particularly the availability
of resources for litigation – determines the extent to which there is
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sustained litigation on any particular issue.”184 From these facts, it
follows that the Court’s agenda is “dependent on a support
structure for legal mobilization, consisting of lawyers,
organizations, and sources of financing, that makes sustained
litigation possible.”185 Hence, when there are sustained litigation
campaigns in the lower court by business interests in favor of large
corporations, the Court is influenced to take up such cases and shift
the law in favor of corporations.186 As another example, when
there are sustained litigation campaigns in the lower courts by
rights-advocacy organizations, the Court is influenced to take up
these types of cases and reform the law in this direction.187
Epps takes as one example the pro-business litigation
campaigns of the 1900s-1920s, which resulted in conservative,
pro-business decisions.188 He takes as another example the
litigation campaigns undertaken by rights-advocacy groups such as
the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, and the NAACP in the
1950s-1970s, which resulted in Supreme Court legal reform in the
area of civil rights.189 In a similar vein, Lee Epstein and Jack
Knight have demonstrated that the Court is often influenced to
pursue an agenda in areas of law where there have been extensive
amicus curiae campaigns.190
All of these phenomena have coalesced in the area of patent
law this decade. There has been an increase in patent lawsuits
being filed in the last ten years, although the number has declined
slightly recently due to more patents being challenged in inter
partes review proceedings.191 In particular, a large number of cases
184
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have been brought by non-practicing entities,192 and this has caught
the attention of the legal academy and of the mainstream press.193
In fact, the problem of non-practicing entities has caught the
explicit attention of the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by Justice
Kennedy’s famous concurrence in the eBay opinion, in which he
opined that non-practicing entities would seldom be able to
demonstrate entitlement to a permanent injunction against patent
infringement.194 High tech companies have undertaken extensive
litigation campaigns in an effort to reform patent law.195 There has
been a marked increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in
patent appeals both before the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court.196
Accordingly, it appears to have been these pressures from
within the legal community that have influenced the Supreme
Court to undertake its prolonged project of patent litigation reform.
B. The Supreme Court Affects its Unstated Policy of Patent
Litigation Reform Through Precedent Vitality
What methodology has the Court used to pursue its policy of
patent litigation reform? As demonstrated above, the most
common rationale relied upon by the Supreme Court in overruling
the Federal Circuit has been that the Federal Circuit disregarded or
cabined Supreme Court precedent from prior to the Patent Act of
192
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193
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1952 or from prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit.197 In
light of general Supreme Court scholarship on stare decisis and
“precedent vitality,” it is not surprising that the Court has followed
this strategy.
Alexander Hamilton famously wrote
[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either the
sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.198
Accordingly, as many have observed, judges rely solely on
institutional and decisional legitimacy to encourage compliance
with their rulings.199 In order to achieve this legitimacy, Hamilton
argued that “it is indispensable that [judges] should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”200
Accordingly, the judiciary relies on the principal of stare decisis:
This doctrine is simply that, when a point or
principle of law has been once officially decided or
settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case
in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it
will no longer be considered as open to examination
or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those
which are bound to follow its adjudications.201
Even the Supreme Court is bound by stare decisis to preserve
the legitimacy of its decisions. Although the Court is free to
overrule its prior decisions, it purports to set forth objective
guidelines for determining when that is appropriate. Hence, the
Court wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that it considers
197
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whether the rule [of the precedent in question] has
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation; whether related principles of
law have so far developed as to have left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine;
or whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.202
Hence, the Court has made explicit that stare decisis is a flexible
doctrine; it is not “inexorable command”203
But even when the Court is not overruling its precedent and
purports to be following precedent faithfully, stare decisis is a very
flexible tool to shape the law. This is because of the tool of
“precedent vitality.” Supreme Court opinions vary in their vitality.
Hanford and Spriggs write, “[s]ome precedents are more legally
authoritative than others and thus have an enhanced ability to
justify and legitimize the justices’ policy choices.”204 But it is not
the age of the precedent that determines its vitality or even
particularly the factors mentioned by the Court in Planned
Parenthood for overruling a case.205 Rather, Hanford and Spriggs
argue that “the vitality of precedent . . . derive[s] from the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of it in other cases.”206 Hence, while
appearing to apply its precedent faithfully, the Supreme Court can
enhance or decrease the vitality of its precedent in various ways.
The Court may apply the rationale of one of its opinions to new
facts; it may expand the rationale of one of its opinions; or it may
distinguish its precedent or limit it to its particular facts or even
ignore a particular case altogether. By these methods, “the decision
to interpret precedent is driven by the desire to influence the scope
202
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and meaning of existing precedent and the goal of legitimizing new
legal policy.”207
This is how the Supreme Court has achieved its patent reform
project to favor accused patent infringers. The most common
rationale the Court has employed to justify reversing the Federal
Circuit is that the circuit court has improperly cabined or
disregarded its precedent.208 But which precedent? The Court
carefully selects which precedent to augment and revitalize and
which precedent to sap and diminish.
A striking example of precedent vitality in action is in the
recent opinion in Impression Products v. Lexmark.209 The Court
had two bodies of precedent that appeared to be in conflict. In
cases such as the 1917 case, Motion Picture Patents, the Court had
held that contractual restrictions imposed by patent holders were
ineffectual to evade patent exhaustion.210 In Motion Picture
Patents, the patent holder had imposed a contract requiring
purchasers of its patented film projectors to use the projectors only
with its separately sold film reels.211 When the patent holder
brought a patent infringement claim to enforce the licensing
restriction, the Court held that the claim must be dismissed because
the patent rights were exhausted by the authorized first sale.212 But
in a 1938 case called General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., the Court reached a contrary result on almost
indistinguishable facts.213 In that case, the plaintiff authorized a
third party to make and sell its patented vacuum tube amplifiers,
but imposed a contractual restriction that purchasers of the
equipment could only use it with amateur radio sets and not in
motion picture houses.214 In this case, the Court held that the patent
holder could sue purchasers of the equipment who used it in movie
207
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theatres for patent infringement and that, because the contract
imposed a restriction on the use of the equipment, there was no
authorized first sale to purchasers who wanted to use it in a
movie house.215
The Federal Circuit had created a rule that contractual
restrictions such as the ones at issue in these cases were effective
to evade exhaustion, so long as they did not violate the antitrust
laws or constitute patent misuse.216 This was based, in part, on a
statement by the Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents that it
was “confirmed in the conclusion which we are announcing”
regarding patent exhaustion by the fact that Congress “has enacted
a law making it unlawful for any person engaged in interstate
commerce ‘to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . .
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use . . . the goods . . . of
a competitor . . . .’”217
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit to rule that
there was an absolute bar on contracting around patent
exhaustion.218 The Court did so by choosing to revitalize its
precedent in Motion Picture Patents and cabin its precedent in
General Talking Pictures. The Court held that Motion Picture
Patents and its other precedent finding patent exhaustion were not
limited to cases involving antitrust violations or patent misuse.
Rather, in those cases, “it was the sale of the items, rather than the
illegality of the restrictions, that prevented the patentees from
enforcing those resale price agreements through patent
infringement suits.”219 And the Court limited its precedent in
General Talking Pictures on the basis that, in that case “a licensee
knowingly made sales outside the scope of its license.”220 Patent
exhaustion was evaded only because the patent holder had granted
a pre-sale restriction to its licensee on whom it was authorized to
215
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sell the patented equipment to.221 “This does not mean that
patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restraints
on purchasers.”222
Hence, the Court relies on the flexible tool of stare decisis to
selectively enhance or diminish the vitality of its precedent in order
to pursue the objective of patent law reform.223 This is why the
most common rationale for overruling the Federal Circuit is that
the court has disregarded its older precedent.
This raises a final question: which precedent does the Supreme
Court rely upon in undertaking this task? The Court often relies on
its precedent from the late 1800s and from the early to midtwentieth century.224 This is noteworthy because these were two
eras of previous Supreme Court patent law reform. Like our
current time, the late 1800s was a time when there was also a
perception that a “patent thicket” was impeding innovation because
non-practicing entities were asserting patents against the railroads
and against farmers.225 When Congress failed to act, the Supreme
Court “demonstrated a willingness to embrace the arguments
advanced by railroads and their liberal supporters.”226 During this
time the courts fashioned equitable doctrines to aid defendants,
such as patent misuse, inequitable conduct, laches, the bar to
patentability caused by secret sales,227 patent exhaustion,228 and the
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reverse doctrine of equivalents.229 Similarly, the early to midtwentieth century was another period of common law patent
reform, when the courts were mistrustful of patent “monopolies”
and strengthened patent misuse, antitrust, and exhaustion remedies
as well as invigorating the obviousness bar.230
The fact that the Supreme Court is hearkening back to these
eras of common law equitable reform helps to explain the other
common rationales discussed above for overruling the Federal
Circuit.231 Flexible standards, such as the four factors for
considering injunctive relief or the broad range of acceptable
rationales for declaring a patent obvious, are more akin to equity
than law and provide more discretion to the district court.232 And
rather than allowing the Federal Circuit to create special rules for
patent law, the Court seeks to impose broader, equitable principles
applicable to all federal cases.233
III. THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
So how does one win a patent case at the Supreme Court? The
ideal petition for certiorari will seek to reverse the Federal Circuit
on some combination of the arguments that (1) the Federal Circuit
failed to grant sufficient discretion to the district court, (2) perhaps
by imposing a rigid inflexible rule that was (3) a special rule for
patent law.234 But the most effective petition will locate a dusty old
Supreme Court case from prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal
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Circuit or even prior to the 1952 passage of the Patent Act and
argue that the Federal Circuit has disregarded this precedent.235
All of this is highly antithetical to the original mission and
purpose of the Federal Circuit as perceived by its stakeholders and
early judges. In the words of Judge Marion T. Bennett, the Federal
Circuit was created during a period of economic recession because
“technological innovation was being impeded by the lack of
uniformity in application of the patent laws.”236 The problem,
according to Judge Bennett, was that the regional circuits were not
only failing to interpret the patent laws with uniformity, but were
also weakening patent rights: “Some of the regional circuit courts,
expressing strong feelings about the dangers of monopoly and
having a low regard for the expertise of the Patent Office, tended
not to give any deference to the administrative examination
process and invalidated many patents.”237 Judge Pauline Newman
has written that “[t]he proposal to reorganize the federal judicial
structure arose not from abstraction or ideology, but from the
practical urgency of recovering the incentive that can be provided
by an effective patent system.”238
Added to this was a strong feeling, advocated by Judge Rich,
that the courts should decide patent questions by interpreting the
1952 Patent Act and not by retreating to judicial opinions from
prior to the passage of the statute. Judge Rich wrote, “[p]ick up any
elementary work on statutory construction and it will tell you that
the end and object of all construction is to find and enforce the
intention of the legislature.”239 For example, Judge Rich objected
to judicial opinions that disregarded the new statutory nonobviousness requirement, “one of the two major changes or
innovations in the statute,” to return to what he considered the
235
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vague and standardless “invention” requirement developed over
the centuries and originating in nineteenth century Supreme Court
precedent.240 In 1983, one year after the Federal Circuit’s
founding, the first Chief Judge of the court, Howard T. Markey,
wrote a law review article called Why Not the Statute?241 This
article represents a cri de guerre to judges and practitioners to
follow the statute at the expense of court opinions. “There is no
common law of patents,” wrote Judge Markey.242 “[W]hen it
comes to patent cases, the statute is the law – and court opinions
containing language and concepts contrary to the statute are
unlawful.”243 Not so, says the Supreme Court: “the 1952 Patent
Act was primarily intended to codify existing law.”244
In sum, the early stakeholders and judges of the Federal Circuit
appeared to view the court’s mission as bringing uniformity to
patent law and strengthening patent rights by imposing definite
rules to replace outdated, vague judicial standards and provide
guidance to the district court. The Supreme Court’s twenty-first
century patent law decisions conflict with this mission on all
fronts. The Supreme Court is demanding that the Federal Circuit
refrain from imposing rigid rules and instead rely on flexible
standards that are faithful to the Supreme Court’s pre-1952
precedent, grant the district courts wide discretion, and favor
accused infringers. It is no wonder that the Supreme Court reverses
or vacates the Federal Circuit in nearly 75% of the patent cases it
hears.
CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has been
engaged in a project of judicial patent litigation reform to favor
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accused infringers. The Court has achieved this largely by
reinvigorating the vitality of its precedent from eras prior to the
passage of the 1952 Patent Act when it was engaged in similar
projects of patent law reform. This project directly conflicts with
the Federal Circuit’s perceived purpose of interpreting the 1952
Act in order to create clear rules to guide the district courts, bring
uniformity to patent law, and strengthen patent rights.

